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Post-Ebola reforms: ample analysis, inadequate action
Reports on the response to Ebola broadly agree on what needs to be done to deal with disease
outbreaks. But Suerie Moon and colleagues find that the world is not yet prepared for future
outbreaks
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In August 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared
the Ebola outbreak in west Africa a public health emergency of
international concern, and the world scrambled to respond.
Better preparedness and a faster, more coordinated response
could have prevented most of the 11 000 deaths directly
attributed to Ebola and also the broader economic, social, and
health crises that ensued. In the aftermath of this collective
failure, numerous reports were published reviewing what went
wrong and how infectious disease outbreaks should be better
managed.
An enormous amount of analysis has been done: as at December
2016, more than 40 targeted examinations1 had been published,
which largely agree on the priority actions.2 The global
community has also launched several initiatives that begin to
fill the identified gaps. Yet, despite the great interest in ensuring
progress, a clear picture of what has actually been achieved is
elusive. Given the importance of improving our ability to battle
current (Zika, yellow fever, etc) and future outbreaks of
infectious disease, we examined seven major reports and
identified areas of consensus on action. We then assessed what
progress has been made and what can be done to address the
gaps.
The seven reports were selected on the following criteria: scope
(tackling problems beyond a single organisation, country, or
sector); diverse authorship (defined by country of origin,
organisational affiliation, area of expertise, and gender); and
public availability (excluding internal reviews) (table 1⇓).3-11
We grouped recommendations under key themes (table 2⇓) and
identified the greatest areas of progress and stasis.
Compliance with International Health
Regulations
All the reports identified inadequate compliance with WHO’s
International Health Regulations (IHR) as a major contributor
to the slow response to Ebola. The regulations are an
international treaty for managing infectious disease outbreaks,
in which 196 countries agreed, among other things, to develop
core capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks, to
report outbreaks rapidly to WHO, and to limit trade or travel
restrictions based on public health or scientific principles. The
reports highlight three major challenges to compliance:
countries’ core capacities, unjustified trade and travel
restrictions, and inability to ensure that governments report
outbreaks quickly.
Core capacities
The regulations require countries to assess their capacities for
disease surveillance and response and to report whether these
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are sufficient to meet their obligations. The Ebola reports
broadly agree that self assessment is inadequate and that we
need more robust means of verification. An important problem
is the inadequate level of core capacities in some countries, and
how to strengthen, finance, and sustain them. The reports make
several recommendations to encourage governments to increase
investment in national capabilities to detect, prevent, and
respond to outbreaks. These include external technical help
conditional on mobilising domestic resources, external financing
for the poorest countries, normative pressure from international
leaders to increase investment, and adding outbreak preparedness
as a factor in the International Monetary Fund’s country
economic assessments, which influence governments’ budget
priorities and access to capital markets.12
Much work has been done in this area. In February 2016, WHO
issued the Joint External Evaluation tool for voluntary external
assessments of national core capacities (P A Sands, O
Kuivasniemi, personal communication, 2016).13 Thirty four
countries (low, middle, and high income) have already been
assessed using the tool or its predecessor, the Global Health
Security Agenda tool (table 3⇓), with 31 countries scheduled
for 2017; 129 countries are not yet scheduled, though around
two dozen of these have expressed interest.14 15 The Alliance for
Country Assessments for Global Health Security and IHR are
providing peer support for the assessments and resulting action
plans. This is substantial progress given the political sensitivity
of external evaluation of a nation’s internal capabilities.
Nevertheless, whether the countries that most need to enhance
their core capacities will be open to assessment remains to be
seen.
Much work remains to ensure that adequate financing and
technical assistance are available for countries that need them.
Ensuring adequate capacities worldwide is estimated to cost
$3.4bn (£2.8bn; €3.2bn) annually, much less than the
$60bn-570bn estimated to be lost each year from pandemics.8 16
Several initiatives have been launched to provide funding. The
G7 committed to assisting 76 countries at the 2015 and 2016
summits.17 Substantial funding has also come from the US,
which announced $1bn for building capacities in 31 countries,18
and South Korea, which announced $100m for 13 countries.19
The World Bank has sought funding to assist at least 25
countries with pandemic preparedness plans in its latest
financing round20 and established an international working group
on financing preparedness in November 2016. The group will
consider how to mobilise both domestic resources and
development assistance, and will report in June 2017.
However, no systematic mechanism exists to track investments
in building core capacity, and the existing data are poor.
Furthermore, the US and Korean commitments are one time
funding allocations with no guarantee that they will be sustained.
The resulting risks are well illustrated by the US, where partisan
politics delayed Zika funding by seven months, forcing public
health actors to use funds allocated to Ebola.21 Investment is
likely to continue to fall short of estimated need.8
Trade and travel
The second major problem is ensuring that trade and travel
restrictions during outbreaks are justified. Fuelled by intense
public concern and media attention, many governments and
private companies restricted trade and travel during the Ebola
outbreak, though many of these measures were not warranted
on scientific or public health grounds. These restrictions
exacerbated economic repercussions and made it harder for aid
organisations to send support to affected regions.
We identified broad consensus across the reports that minimising
such restrictions is critical to avoid isolating and economically
punishing countries that experience outbreaks. Furthermore, if
governments assume that reporting will lead to unwarranted
trade and travel restrictions, they may be less forthcoming.
Potential solutions range from WHO and the UN more
assertively “naming and shaming” countries and private
companies that impose unjustified restrictions on WHO working
with the World Trade Organization, International Civil Aviation
Organization, and International Maritime Organization to
develop standards and enforcement mechanisms for trade and
travel restrictions.4-10 These organisations have held discussions,
but they have not announced any initiatives. The IHR are not
binding for private companies, underscoring the need for other
guidelines to keep airlines, shipping, and other key industries
operating during outbreaks; none have been announced.
Non-binding guidelines may not suffice, but developing more
specific expectations and compliance mechanisms that can be
tested in future outbreaks will be a step forward.
Outbreak reporting
The third compliance issue concerns countries’ obligation to
report outbreaks swiftly. The reports recommend reinforcing
this obligation by WHO publicising when countries delay
reporting suspected outbreaks and ensuring that countries rapidly
receive operational and financial support as soon as they do
report.
A new incentive for early reporting is the World Bank’s
Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility, created to provide
rapid financing for outbreak control and to protect countries
from the high economic costs of outbreaks through an insurance
mechanism. It has received pledges of $50m from Japan and
€65m from Germany, which is expected to cover most of its
start-up costs.22 Its speed and effectiveness cannot be tested until
the next outbreak strikes. The extent to which WHO will
publicly call on governments to report outbreaks or refrain from
excessive trade and travel restrictions will depend on who is
elected the next director general in May 2017.
Improving knowledge sharing and
research
The reports recognise that timely sharing of knowledge,
research, and health technologies is crucial for both preventing
future outbreaks and mitigating the effects of existing outbreaks.
Several reports outline problems with how individuals,
organisations, and countries handled epidemiological, genomic,
clinical, and clinical trial data, as well as patient samples, during
and after the Ebola outbreak. For example, there was no platform
for exchanging epidemiological data between the governments
of the three most affected countries. Although some researchers
published genomic sequencing data from virus samples early
in the outbreak, others delayed putting similar information into
the public domain, thereby slowing collective understanding of
the causative agent and its evolution.23 Effective strategies for
community mobilisation that had been developed in central
Africa were not shared or applied quickly in west Africa.24
Another failure was the lack of adequate research into the Ebola
virus before the 2014 outbreak, which left the world without
needed drugs, vaccines, and rapid diagnostic tests. Organisations
such as the European Innovative Medicines Initiative and the
US Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority
have invested in these areas, but the US National Academy of
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Medicine report estimated an ongoing investment gap of $1bn
a year.8
Even when research was carried out for the Ebola
emergency—including the rVSV vaccine trial in Guinea that
recently published positive results25— experts disagreed on
acceptable designs for clinical trials, and the regulatory pathways
for product approval were unclear. In the absence of clear
guidelines on using the scarce supply of existing experimental
therapies, west Africa had minimal access to them.
The reports call for developing policies and platforms for
exchanging best practices for mobilising communities and
delivering care, for sharing research findings, and for modifying
the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework—which
governs the sharing of flu virus samples and related benefits—to
include other pathogens such as Ebola and to be made legally
binding. They also recommend increasing international public
funding for research on pathogens that are likely to cause
epidemics (because market incentives do not drive investment
for diseases that primarily affect poor countries or occur
sporadically), improving equitable access to technologies, and
building local research capacity.
Encouragingly, some of the proposed solutions were
incorporated in the response to Zika. In September 2015, WHO
convened a meeting of researchers, who agreed that rapid, open
data sharing should be standard in emergencies.26 The
International Committee of Medical Journal Editors
subsequently confirmed that publishing relevant data in a health
emergency would not prejudice later publication.27 The WHO
Bulletin has since launched the ZikaOpen platform to make
research on Zika more rapidly available.28
WHO and Médecins Sans Frontières have been working together
to create a virtual biobank for existing Ebola samples. However,
no framework has been agreed for the management or sharing
of samples relevant to health emergencies, and a committee
convened by WHO recommended, at the end of 2016, against
expanding the PIP Framework beyond influenza.29 No
negotiations have been started for alternative arrangements for
sample sharing. How best practices on community mobilisation
will be incorporated into international responses in the future
is unclear.
For future research, WHO has created a list of priority
pathogens, mappings of research and development pipelines
(starting with Zika and MERS), and target product profiles for
Zika. WHO has also organised a working group to develop
vaccine trial designs for priority pathogens. The US National
Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine are studying
what worked and what didn’t in the vaccine clinical trials during
the Ebola outbreak and are planning an initiative to coordinate
clinical trial designs and regulatory frameworks.30
Substantial efforts are also under way to increase funding for
research and development and for stockpiling existing products.
The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI),
which has an initial focus on vaccines for the MERS, Lassa,
and Nipah viruses, announced in January 2017 that it had raised
$460m from Norway, Japan, Germany, the Wellcome Trust,
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, with a five year
goal of $1bn. India is finalising its contribution, and the
European Commission plans to cofund projects with CEPI.31 In
early 2016 the Gavi Alliance announced a $5m payment to
Merck to ensure adequate production of the rVSV vaccine in
case of a resurgence of Ebola.32 Beyond vaccines, funding
shortages remain for research into drugs, diagnostics, and other
health technologies, such as personal protective equipment. And
even if products are successfully developed, international
arrangements to ensure equitable access are lacking.
Strengthening WHO, UN, and broader
humanitarian systems
All reports agreed that WHO and the broader UN and
humanitarian systems needed to be strengthened after their
inadequate response to the Ebola emergency. Although the
reports supported maintaining WHO’s role as the leader of global
preparedness and response for disease outbreaks, they agreed
that it needs substantial reform to do so credibly. They identified
operational problems related to WHO’s ability to tackle disease
outbreaks on the ground as well as broader, institutional
problems that are not limited to emergencies or outbreaks.
Operational problems
The reports generally agreed that WHO was unable to respond
rapidly to outbreaks partly because it lacked the technical
capacity and partly because it lacked an “emergency culture”
that could make decisions quickly, work with a broad set of
partners, and be relatively flexible in its approach. Their
recommendations included enhancing WHO’s operational
capacity and its ability to issue technical and normative guidance
and coordinate with others. The reports called for an emergency
centre with dedicated funding, clear lines of command from
headquarters to regional and national offices, and strong
mechanisms for accountability through a board separate from
WHO’s two existing governing bodies (the executive board and
the World Health Assembly).
WHO responded by establishing a new emergency programme
that incorporates its capacity to respond to disease outbreaks
(Global Outbreak and Response Network), humanitarian
assistance (foreign medical teams), and its health cluster
leadership role under the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs.33 The programme is governed by an
independent oversight and advisory committee34 and has already
led WHO responses to a series of crises, including cholera in
Haiti; yellow fever in Angola, Uganda, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo; and the Zika outbreak. WHO has also
fostered emergency medical teams to provide surge support to
national health systems, with about 75 medical teams on
standby, and has developed a formal process of quality control
for selection, training, and verification of the teams.35
WHO has created a contingency fund to provide rapid funding
in emergencies, with a target of $100m. To date it has received
only $31.5m, much of which is already committed to ongoing
crises. Of the $1.24bn WHO requested for specific ongoing
emergencies and the broader emergency programme, member
states had provided only about 41% as at December 2016.36 This
lacklustre response reflects the continuing instability of WHO’s
emergency capacity.
Institutional problems
Institutional problems identified in the reports include unstable
financing, minimal transparency, human resource shortcomings,
and little accountability after failure. The reports recommend
that WHO focus more on core functions; reform its management
of human resources; increase transparency and accountability
through a freedom of information policy; create an inspector
general role; and marshal more effective leadership.
Several reports also emphasised safeguarding WHO’s
independence from any single member state or other party, an
issue inextricably linked to funding. These recommendations
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stem from concerns that political pressure might lead to undue
delays in the declaration of a public health emergency.9 Many
reports urged member states to provide WHO with more reliable,
guaranteed money by increasing assessed contributions, which
have been frozen in nominal terms (a decline in real terms) since
the 1990s. Only a fifth of the organisation’s budget is
guaranteed. Donor funds, usually tied to donor priorities,
comprise the remainder.
WHO has not initiated any major institutional reforms since the
Ebola outbreak. At the 2015 World Health Assembly,
governments did not support a proposal to increase assessed
contributions by 5%, which would have raised the guaranteed
budget only from around 20% to 21%. The matter was not
substantively debated at the 2016 assembly, although it will be
raised again in 2017. A few leading European and African
member states supported increasing assessed contributions at
the October 2016 WHO financing meeting, but most did not.
Furthermore, no new transparency policy, organisation-wide
accountability mechanism, or redefinition of core functions has
taken place. Spearheading institutional reforms is likely to fall
to the next director general.
UN and humanitarian systems
Many reports mentioned poor coordination between UN
agencies, WHO, national governments, community leaders, and
local and international non-governmental organisations and
weak arrangements for accountability. Several of the reports
suggested improving existing bodies, such as the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (IASC) and the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, rather than creating new ones, as was
done for Ebola.37 They also said that the profile of health crises
should be raised across the UN.
The reports also highlighted the importance of accountability
arrangements given the demanding nature of reforming complex
organisations and systems. Their recommendations included an
independent accountability commission,4 an annual report on
global health security to the secretary general of the UN or the
General Assembly,3 an independent review of implementation
after two years,8 and a council on global public health crises in
the General Assembly.7
In April 2016 the UN secretary general announced arrangements
for WHO to inform his office of all grade 2-3 outbreaks and the
IASC of outbreaks that may require a broader UN response.
The secretary general also formed a global health crises task
force to identify next steps, led by the heads of major UN
agencies and the World Bank, with participation from
independent experts and civil society.38
However, no ongoing monitoring or accountability mechanism
has yet been created. Identifying how to establish meaningful
system-wide accountability will be a key challenge for the task
force and new secretary general. Given that no member state
representatives are on the task force, how to continue to engage
national political leaders will also be important.
Conclusion
Ebola, and more recently Zika and yellow fever, have shown
that the global system for preventing, detecting, and responding
to disease outbreaks is not yet reliable or robust. The seven
reports on the Ebola crisis largely agreed on the fundamental
reasons behind our collective failure and the priorities for
change. Substantial reforms are already under way and deserve
support. But many problems remain, without dedicated political
or financial resources. At the west African workshop on global
reforms after Ebola, ministerial representatives from Guinea,
Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Economic Community
of West African States also concluded that further reforms were
urgently needed in west Africa and globally.39
We have identified several priority gaps. Adequate, sustained
financing and technical assistance must be mobilised to ensure
that every country has the basic core capacities for identifying
and responding to outbreaks. Unwarranted trade and travel
restrictions need to be tackled. Many problems regarding health
technologies are unresolved, including the need for international
norms on sharing data and samples, standardised clinical trial
protocols, clear regulatory processes, funding for research and
development beyond vaccines, and measures to ensure equitable
access to diagnostics, vaccines, and drugs for outbreaks. Finally,
a core group of WHO member states must commit to tackling
its deeper institutional weaknesses, such as unstable financing,
unclear organisational focus, limited transparency, and
vulnerability to political pressures from member states.
The reports concluded that the world remains grossly
underprepared for outbreaks of infectious disease, which are
likely to become more frequent in the coming decades. The
window to launch major reforms opened immediately after the
crisis, but may be closing as political attention wanes.
Determined leaders in Japan and Germany have kept outbreaks
on the agenda of recent G7 and G20 summits, but other global
crises continue to demand attention. Leadership changes in some
of the most powerful countries, and at the head of WHO and
the UN, have added considerable uncertainty about future global
readiness for outbreaks.
Monitoring progress is therefore vital. A permanent and
independent mechanism to hold governments and
intergovernmental organisations accountable is sorely needed.
The UN secretary general’s global health task force has an
important role in making arrangements for follow-up. The world
will not be ready for the next outbreak without deeper and more
comprehensive change.
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Key messages
Seven reports on the global response to Ebola largely agree on what went wrong and what needs to be done
Substantial efforts to tackle these problems are under way, but progress has been mixed
Many critical problems have been given inadequate political or financial resources
The global community needs to increase resources and implement monitoring and accountability mechanisms to ensure the world is
better prepared for the next pandemic
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Tables
Table 1| Reviewed reports into Ebola response
Scope and areas of emphasisConvener (chair)TitlePublication date
Commissioned by WHO
WHO’s performance, focus on operational capacity,
organisational culture, financing, communications, role in
broader humanitarian systems
WHO (Barbara Stocking)Ebola interim assessment panelJuly 2015
WHO core mandate and critical functions, focus on reform of
WHO’s work in outbreaks and emergencies
WHO director general (David
Nabarro)
Advisory group on reform of WHO’s work
in outbreaks and emergencies
November 2015; January
2016
Recommendations for improved implementation of IHR, based
on assessment of their effectiveness in Ebola outbreak and
the status of implementation of recommendations from the
previous review committee
WHO director general (Didier
Houssin)
Report of the review committee on the
role of the IHR(2005) in the Ebola
outbreak and response
May 2016
Commissioned by others
Global system performance, with focus on IHR compliance,
knowledge management, R&D, governance of global system,
WHO reform
Harvard / LSHTM (Peter Piot)Will Ebola change the game? Ten
essential reforms for the next pandemic
November 2015
Recommendations for the future based on review of past
outbreak emergencies, with focus on the economic case for
investing pandemic preparedness, national core capacities,
WHO operational capacity, and R&D
US National Academy of
Medicine ( Peter Sands)
The neglected dimension of global
security: a framework to counter infectious
disease crises
January 2016
Recommendations for WHO, based on review of past
responses to health emergencies, with a focus on six stand
out problems
Lead author: Francesco
Checchi
World Health Organization and
emergency health: if not now, when?
January 2016
Recommendations to strengthen national and international
systems to prevent and effectively respond to future health
crises, with a focus on national health systems, WHO and
UN systems, development aid, R&D, financing, UN follow-up
UN secretary general ( Jakaya
Kikwete)
Protecting humanity from future health
crises: report of the high-level panel on
the global response to health crises
January 2016 (panel
report); April 2016 (UN
secretary general’s
commentary)
IHR=International Health Regulations; LSHTM=London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
For personal use only: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2017;356:j280 doi: 10.1136/bmj.j280 (Published 2017-01-23 2017-01-23 2017-01-23) Page 6 of 8
ANALYSIS
Table 2| Breakdown of reports by topic, with key areas of agreement.
Areas of agreementTopic
Compliance with IHR
Need to develop national core capacities and for domestic and external financing. Need more credible assessment
of country core capacities, including proposals for independent, external, and peer assessments. WHO technical
support to countries needed
National health systems and core capacities
Need incentives for early reporting of outbreaks and stronger disincentives or compliance mechanisms for undue
trade and travel restrictions, for both governments and private sector
Trade and travel restrictions
Knowledge management
Need for systems for rapid sharing of epidemiological and other research data. Platforms for sharing strategies
for community mobilisation and communications
Sharing epidemiological and research data
Need global R&D funding for emerging infectious diseases. Need WHO to convene, set priorities, and coordinate
pandemic related R&D. Need to directly ensure that affected populations have access to relevant health
technologies. Expansion of PIP Framework to other pathogens. Need agreed research standards and processes
for regulatory approval. Need to build local research capacity and engage local researchers and communities.
R&D of health technologies
UN and humanitarian emergency systems
Need better capacity for health and humanitarian actors to work together in crises and to strengthen capacity of
existing institutions rather than create new ones
Operational
Need to systematically bring health matters before broader UN governing bodies (either UN General Assembly
or Security Council)
Political
Readiness and reform of WHO
Use intermediate alert before public health emergencies. Measures for greater transparency and independence
of declaring an emergency
PHEIC declaration
Creation of dedicated WHO centre with proposals for a separate oversight body (whether governing, technical,
advisory, or independent board). Need to develop operational emergency culture and to strengthen ability to work
with non-state bodies
Emergency capacity and culture
Consolidation of emergency related units in WHO. Creation of virtual global health emergency workforce under
WHO. Need for strengthened capacity of WHO staff at country and regional offices, with objective performance
management and merit based, competitive appointments
Human resources
Need for strong leadership, particularly electing a director general able to challenge or hold accountable member
states. More streamlined relations between headquarters, regional, and country offices in emergencies, including
central role of headquarters if countries have inadequate capacity. Little discussion of the organisation’s core
functions
Governance and leadership
Need to improve predictability of financing. Several calls for increasing assessed contributions (by 5-10%) and
funding emergency work with core budget
Financing
Follow-up and accountability
Need better transparency and harmonisation of international aid flows. WHO contingency fund. Global R&D
pandemic financing ≥$1bn a year. World Bank PEF and other rapidly disbursed funding sources for emergencies.
National health system strengthening financing.
Financing
Need for ongoing mechanisms for monitoring and accountability for preparedness and response efforts.Accountability
PHEIC=public health emergency of international concern; R&D=research and development; PIP=pandemic influenza preparedness; PEF=Pandemic Emergency
Financing Facility
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Table 3| Countries externally evaluated by WHO member states (P A Sands, O Kuivasniemi, personal communication, 2016)
No (%) of income
group completed or
scheduled (n=194)
Not scheduledScheduled for 2017Completed
10/31 (32)Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad,
Comoros, DPRK, DRC, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, South
Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe
-Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Liberia, Mozambique,
Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda
Low income
countries
23/50 (48)Bhutan, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Rep of Congo, Egypt, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Lesotho,
Mauritania, Moldova, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Papua
New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sri Lanka, Swaziland,
Syria, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zambia
Cameroon, Djibouti, Ghana,
Kenya, Kiribati, Lao PDR,
Micronesia, Mongolia,
Philippines, Samoa, Solomon
Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu
Armenia, Bangladesh,
Cambodia, Cote d'Ivoire,
Kyrgyz Republic, Morocco,
Pakistan, Sudan, Tunisia,
Ukraine, Vietnam
Lower middle
income
countries
15/55 (27)Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Grenada, Guyana, Iraq, Jamaica,
Kazakhstan, Libya, Macedonia, Mauritius, Mexico,
Montenegro, Panama, Paraguay, Romania, Russian
Fiji, Iran, Malaysia, Maldives,
Marshall Islands, Palau,
Tuvalu
Albania, Belize, Georgia,
Jordan, Lebanon, Namibia,
Peru, Turkmenistan
Upper middle
Income
Federation, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Serbia,
South Africa, Suriname, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela
16/56 (29)Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino,
Finland, Italy, Japan, Rep
Korea, Kuwait, Nauru, Oman,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Switzerland, UAE
Bahrain, Portugal, Qatar,
United Kingdom, USA
High income
Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uruguay
0/2 (0)Cook Islands, NiueNot classified
64/194 (34)Total
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